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ALTERNATIVES TO CALIFORNIA’S SB 27: 
INCENTIVIZING THE RELEASE OF TAX 
RETURNS WITHOUT RESTRICTING BALLOT 
ACCESS 
Matthew Tang*
Donald Trump is the first President since 1977, and the first major-
party nominee since 1980, to refuse to release any of his federal income 
tax returns. This break in tradition has led lawmakers in at least twenty-
five states to propose legislation requiring presidential candidates to 
disclose their tax returns in order to appear on state ballots. California 
is one of those states. On July 30, 2017, California Governor Gavin 
Newsom signed SB 27 into law, effectively barring presidential 
candidates who have not made available for public inspection the last 
five years of their income tax returns from appearing on the state’s 
primary ballots. However, on October 2, 2019, a federal district court 
issued a preliminary injunction against SB 27 on the theory that it 
violated the Presidential Qualifications Clause as well as the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments. And on November 21, 2019, the California 
Supreme Court struck down SB 27 for violating article II of the 
California Constitution. This Note proposes two alternative approaches 
to incentivizing the release of tax returns that avoid the California and 
Federal Constitutional challenges faced by SB 27. The first involves 
fining or otherwise penalizing presidential candidates who fail to release 
their tax returns without denying them ballot access. The second involves 
taking note of a candidate’s failure to release his or her tax returns either 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“If I decide to run for office, I’ll produce my tax returns, 
absolutely.”1 Six years after making this initial commitment—three 
after assuming office—President Trump has yet to produce a single 
page of the promised documents.2 It seems that a forty-year tradition 
of Presidents releasing their tax returns has come to an end.3 
Perhaps in response to President Trump’s refusal to release his 
tax returns, California recently enacted Senate Bill 27 (SB 27) 
requiring that presidential candidates make available for public 
inspection the last five years of their income tax returns in order to 
appear on the state’s primary ballots.4 California is not alone. In at 
least twenty-five states, lawmakers have introduced bills requiring 
presidential candidates to make similar disclosures.5 By mandating a 
practice that was once voluntary, these bills codify a custom that has 
long served the twin goals of voter education and candidate 
accountability.6 
Proponents of the bills argue that a candidate’s tax returns afford 
voters invaluable insight into a candidate’s values in ways that 
campaign ads and ballot biographies cannot.7 The business dealings 
 
 1. Ireland AM, Colette Fitzpatrick Meets Donald Trump!, YOUTUBE (May 20, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hg-5KEt1Abg. 
 2. Katie Rogers, Trump on Releasing His Tax Returns: From ‘Absolutely’ to ‘Political 
Prosecution’, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/09/us/politics/trump-
taxes.html (updated Sept. 27, 2020). 
 3. See Joseph J. Thorndike, Tax History: From Nixon to Trump: A Short History of Voluntary 
Tax Disclosure, TAX NOTES (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-
federal/return-preparation/tax-history-nixon-trump-short-history-voluntary-tax-
disclosure/2019/02/11/29409. 
 4. S.B. 27, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (“Notwithstanding any other law, the Secretary 
of State shall not print the name of a candidate for President of the United States on a primary 
election ballot, unless the candidate, at least 98 days before the presidential primary election, files 
with the Secretary of State copies of every income tax return the candidate filed with the Internal 
Revenue Service in the five most recent taxable years . . . . Within five days of receipt of the 
candidate’s tax returns, the Secretary of State shall make redacted versions of the tax returns 
available to the public on the Secretary of State’s internet website.”). 
 5. Alexi McCammond, The Big Picture: The State Efforts to Keep Trump Off the 2020 Ballot, 
AXIOS (June 24, 2018), https://www.axios.com/states-tax-return-laws-presidential-2020-trump-
88e84cce-7214-409d-b4c7-a24aad919bdb.html/. 
 6. See S.B. 27 (“The information in tax returns . . . helps voters to make a more informed 
decision. . . . The people of California can better estimate the risks of any given Presidential 
candidate engaging in corruption or the appearance of corruption if they have access to candidates’ 
tax returns.”). 
 7. See id. (“[I]ncome tax returns provide voters with essential information regarding the 
candidate’s potential conflicts of interest, business dealings, financial status, and charitable 
donations.”). 
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and charitable donations revealed by a candidate’s tax returns, for 
example, give voters a raw glimpse into a candidate’s activities 
separate from the carefully curated image he or she might present on 
the campaign trail. Moreover, tax returns provide states with an 
invaluable tool to ferret out conflicts of interest, corruption, or 
violations of law.8 States have an indisputable interest in exposing the 
unscrupulous—and perhaps criminal—activity of anyone who might 
appear on their ballots, and that interest reaches its apex when the 
ballots list candidates for the highest office in the land.9 
On the other hand, the principles undergirding laws like SB 27 
can in theory support less palatable disclosure requirements. When 
vetoing a similar bill two years ago,10 then California Governor Jerry 
Brown wrote: “Today we require tax returns, but what would be next? 
Five years of health records? A certified birth certificate? High school 
report cards? And will these requirements vary depending on which 
political party is in power?”11 But more importantly, laws that make 
ballot access contingent on the production of tax returns may not pass 
constitutional muster. A mere four months after California Governor 
Gavin Newsom signed SB 27 into law, the California Supreme Court 
struck it down for violating the California Constitution.12 Although 
similar statutes in other states are not subject to the California 
 
 8. See id. 
 9. Even if a presidential candidate is not a citizen of a state requiring the production of his or 
her tax returns, such a state nevertheless maintains an interest in ensuring compliance with federal 
law on behalf of its citizens. For example, SB 27 cites California’s interest in making sure that 
“statutory prohibitions on behavior such as insider trading are detected and punished.” Id. Insider 
trading affects shareholders not just in California, but in all fifty states. Moreover, states may have 
an interest in exposing violations of the Emoluments Clauses of the United States Constitution. See 
Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. Trump, 939 F.3d 131, 138–39, 142 (2d Cir. 2019) (finding 
that owners of hotels, restaurants, and event spaces had standing to sue President Trump for 
accepting government patronage of Trump properties because such patronage diverted business 
away from their establishments). But see Blumenthal v. Trump, 949 F.3d 14, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2020) 
(finding that Congress’s “loss of political power” related to President Trump’s alleged violations 
of the Emoluments Clauses was insufficient to support standing); In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 379 
(4th Cir. 2019) (finding that Maryland and the District of Columbia’s interest in enforcing the 
Emoluments Clauses was too “attenuated and abstract” to support standing), reh’g en banc granted, 
780 F. App’x 36 (4th Cir. 2019). 
 10. See S.B. 149, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
 11. SB 149 Veto Message from Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. (Oct. 15, 2017), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20171219002118/https:/www.gov.ca.gov/docs/SB_149_Veto_Messa
ge_2017.pdf. 
 12. See Patterson v. Padilla, 451 P.3d 1171, 1191 (Cal. 2019) (finding on Nov. 21, 2019 that 
SB 27 violated article II, section 5(c) of the California Constitution). SB 27 was signed into law on 
July 30, 2019. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 6883 (Deering 2020), invalidated by Patterson v. Padilla, 
451 P.3d 1171 (Cal. 2019). 
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Constitution, opponents of SB 27 have additionally argued that the 
law, and presumably others like it, run afoul of the Federal 
Constitution.13 In particular, they assert that because Article II of the 
Federal Constitution establishes the substantive qualifications for the 
presidency,14 requiring the production of tax returns constitutes an 
impermissible addition to these qualifications.15 They further contend 
that such a requirement infringes upon the First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of candidates and voters.16 
Part II of this Note briefly surveys the constitutional challenges 
brought against SB 27, one of which has already proven fatal to the 
law.17 The remainder of the Note explores two potential alternatives 
to SB 27 that accomplish substantially the same goals while 
sidestepping many of the constitutional issues that plagued it. In 
particular, Part III examines the potential for California and other 
states to fine or otherwise penalize presidential candidates who fail to 
release their tax returns without denying them ballot access. And Part 
IV examines the viability of laws that do not require candidates to 
produce their tax returns, but instead allow ballots or informational 
material accompanying them to take note of a candidate’s failure to do 
so. 
II.  CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO SB 27 
The following contains a brief overview of the three main 
constitutional challenges to SB 27—the first, based on the California 
Constitution, applies only to California laws, but the latter two apply 
with equal force to similar regulations in other states. This is helpful 
both to understand the weight of the arguments against SB 27 and its 
peers and to appreciate the hurdles that this Note’s two proposed 
alternatives seek to overcome. 
 
 13. See Griffin v. Padilla, 408 F. Supp. 3d 1169, 1173 (E.D. Cal. 2019), vacated, No. 2:19-cv-
01477-MCE-DB, 2020 WL 1442091 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2020). 
 14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 15. See, e.g., Jackson C. Smith, Thornton & the Pursuit of the American Presidency, 43 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 39, 48 (2017) (“As with members of Congress, the Constitution is the exclusive source 
of the qualifications to serve as President of the United States, and states are divested of power to 
add qualifications to those already fixed within the Constitution.”); see also Griffin, 408 F. Supp. 
3d at 1177–81 (concluding that SB 27 likely violated the Article II Qualifications Clause). 
 16. See Griffin, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 1181–85. 
 17. See Patterson, 451 P.3d at 1191 (decisively nullifying SB 27). 
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A.  California’s Presidential Primary Clause Challenge 
Article II, section 5(c) of the California Constitution states: 
The Legislature shall provide for partisan elections for 
presidential candidates, and political party and party central 
committees, including an open presidential primary whereby 
the candidates on the ballot are those found by the Secretary 
of State to be recognized candidates throughout the nation 
or throughout California for the office of President of the 
United States, and those whose names are placed on the 
ballot by petition, but excluding any candidate who has 
withdrawn by filing an affidavit of noncandidacy.18 
In Patterson v. Padilla,19 the California Supreme Court 
interpreted this clause as establishing national or state recognition of 
presidential candidacy as a sufficient, rather than necessary, condition 
for ballot access.20 In other words, the California State Legislature 
may not direct the Secretary of State to exclude from the ballot 
someone who is “recognized . . . throughout the nation or throughout 
California” as a candidate “for the office of President of the United 
States.”21 Such a person must appear on the primary ballot unless he 
or she files an affidavit of noncandidacy.22 Because SB 27 purported 
to exclude even nationally recognized presidential candidates from the 
California primary ballot if they failed to release the last five years of 
their income tax returns, its conflict with the California Constitution 
rendered it invalid.23 
The California Supreme Court noted that its ruling in Patterson 
did not address any federal claims.24 However, one month before the 
California Supreme Court invalidated SB 27 on California 
constitutional grounds, a federal district court in Griffin v. Padilla25 
issued a preliminary injunction against SB 27 on federal constitutional 
 
 18. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 5(c) (emphasis added). 
 19. 451 P.3d 1171 (Cal. 2019). 
 20. See id. at 1179 (finding that the clause “is most naturally read as conveying a rule of 
inclusivity for presidential primary elections that the Legislature cannot contravene”). 
 21. See id. (quoting CAL. CONST. art. II, § 5(c)). 
 22. See id. at 1173. 
 23. See id. at 1179–80. 
 24. Id. at 1173 n.1. 
 25. 408 F. Supp. 3d 1169 (E.D. Cal. 2019), vacated, No. 2:19-cv-01477-MCE-DB, 2020 WL 
1442091 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2020). 
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grounds.26 In doing so, the district court determined that SB 27 likely 
violated the Article II Qualifications Clause as well as the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.27 If its reasoning reflects the way the U.S. 
Supreme Court would analyze the matter, laws like SB 27 in other 
states may very well be unconstitutional. Therefore, the primary goal 
of this Note is to examine alternatives to SB 27 that address not only 
the California Presidential Primary Clause challenge, but the Federal 
Qualifications Clause and First and Fourteenth Amendment 
challenges as well. 
B.  Qualifications Clause Challenge 
The Article II Qualifications Clause of the Federal Constitution 
states: 
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the 
United States, at the time of the Adoption of this 
Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; 
neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall 
not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been 
fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.28 
The Qualifications Clause challenge to SB 27 centered around the 
contention that the clause enumerates an exclusive set of requirements 
for the presidency, and that SB 27 unconstitutionally expanded this set 
of requirements by mandating that presidential candidates release their 
tax returns.29 Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly held 
 
 26. See id. at 1173. 
 27. Id. at 1177–85. 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 29. See Griffin, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 1180. SB 27 had the added wrinkle in that it applied to 
primary elections rather than general elections. The U.S. Constitution makes no mention of primary 
elections, and constitutional limitations on a state’s authority to regulate the general election 
arguably do not apply to presidential primaries, especially when political parties are in many 
instances free to ignore the results of such primaries. See Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 486–
91 (1975) (finding that a state court’s injunction refusing to seat party-selected delegates in favor 
of elected delegates violated “the Party’s right to determine the composition of its National 
Convention in accordance with Party standards”); Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin ex 
rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 126 (1981) (holding that Wisconsin “cannot require . . . delegates to 
the National Party Convention vote there in accordance with the primary results, if to do so would 
violate Party rules”). But the Supreme Court has held that the right to participate in primaries “is 
protected just as is the right to vote at the election, where the primary is by law made an integral 
part of the election machinery.” United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 318 (1941); see also Smith 
v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661–62 (1994) (“[T]he right to vote in such a primary for the 
nomination of candidates without discrimination by the State, like the right to vote in a general 
election, is a right secured by the Constitution.”). In fact, the Court has specifically applied the 
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the Article II requirements to be exclusive, the Court in U.S. Term 
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton30 found the Article I requirements for 
congressional office31 to be exclusive,32 and much of the reasoning in 
U.S. Term Limits applies to presidential elections as well.33 
However, while the States likely cannot impose additional 
substantive qualifications to the presidency, the Court has upheld 
“generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the 
integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself.”34 The 
constitutionality of SB 27 under Article II therefore hinges on whether 
the tax return requirement constitutes a substantive qualification for 
which Article II already provides an exhaustive list, or merely a 
procedural rule necessary to facilitate the choosing of the President.35 
For example, the Court has allowed states to impose filing deadlines,36 
minimum signature requirements,37 and primary election 
requirements38 as preconditions for ballot access. Because these types 
of regulations prevent “voter confusion, ballot overcrowding, or the 
 
Article I Qualifications Clause to primary election law. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 
479 U.S. 208, 227 (1986) (“[W]e hold that the Qualifications Clauses of Article I, § 2, and the 
Seventeenth Amendment are applicable to primary elections in precisely the same fashion that they 
apply to general congressional elections.”). It is therefore unlikely that SB 27’s application only to 
primary elections would have made a meaningful difference under federal constitutional analysis. 
 30. 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have 
attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and 
who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.”); U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (“No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of 
thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, 
be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.”). 
 32. U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 827. 
 33. The U.S. Term Limits Court noted in dicta that the States “have just as much right, and no 
more, to prescribe new qualifications for a representative, as they have for a president.” Id. at 803 
(quoting 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH 
A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES, 
BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF CONSTITUTION 434–35 (3d ed. 1858)). 
 34. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983). 
 35. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 826–38 (stating that the Framers “intended to grant 
States authority to protect the integrity and regularity of the election process by regulating election 
procedures, . . . not to provide them with license to impose substantive qualifications”). 
 36. See Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 438 (1971) (finding that Georgia’s early filing 
deadline “for candidates not endorsed by established parties” was reasonable). 
 37. See id. at 442 (upholding a Georgia law requiring that presidential candidates from minor-
parties obtain signatures from 5 percent of eligible voters); Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 
767, 787 (1974) (upholding a similar Texas law). 
 38. See Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 190–91 (1986) (upholding a 
Washington law requiring that a minor-party candidate receive at least 1 percent of the votes cast 
in the primary election). 
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presence of frivolous candidacies,”39 they serve as procedural 
requirements necessary for the administration of elections rather than 
restrictions on candidacy. 
Some do not view a tax return requirement as fundamentally 
different from any other procedural requirement.40 A tax return 
requirement attempts to prevent voter confusion by providing voters 
with information relevant to their choice for president.41 And it 
prevents the presence of frivolous candidates by ensuring that 
candidates commit to a minimum level of transparency.42 Moreover, a 
tax return requirement can be viewed as a procedural step that does 
not exclude any particular class of candidates—anyone can in theory 
release his or her tax returns as a step towards candidacy.43 
However, others find the relationship between requiring the 
release of tax returns and the mechanics of running an election to be 
much more tenuous.44 The 2016 election involved a nonfrivolous 
major-party candidate who deliberately refused to release his tax 
returns, and it is unclear how the release of his tax returns would have 
benefitted any election procedure. Additionally, the Court in U.S. 
Term Limits had invalidated a ballot access restriction for having “the 
likely effect of handicapping a class of candidates and [having] the 
sole purpose of creating additional qualifications indirectly.”45 Some 
point out that laws like SB 27 clearly disadvantage President Trump, 
and that the purpose of such laws seems to be less about providing 
voters with relevant information and more about adding a qualification 
that Trump has yet to satisfy.46 Because SB 27 did not appear to be 
 
 39. Id. at 195. 
 40. See Danielle Lang, Candidate Disclosure and Ballot Access Bills: Novel Questions on 
Voting and Disclosure, 65 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 46, 46 (2017). 
 41. See id. at 60. 
 42. See id. at 48 (“[M]ost serious candidates for the presidency have released their tax returns 
for public inspection.”). 
 43. See id. at 56. 
 44. See, e.g., Derek T. Muller, Weaponizing the Ballot, FLA. STATE U. L. REV. (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 2), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3450649. 
 45. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 836 (1995). 
 46. A California bill similar to SB 27 and introduced in 2017 explicitly referenced Donald 
Trump. S.B. 149, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (as introduced Jan. 18, 2017) (“Donald 
Trump’s refusal to release his income tax returns departed from decades of established political 
tradition . . . .”). Ballot access legislation introduced in New York was titled the Tax Returns 
Uniformly Made Public Act, or “TRUMP” Act. S.B. 26, 2017–2018 Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2017). 
Similar legislation in Minnesota adopted the same title. S.B. 199, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Minn. 
2019). 
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procedural in either nature or intent, they conclude that California 
exceeded its constitutional authority by enacting it.47 
C.  First and Fourteenth Amendment Challenges 
Analysis into the federal constitutionality of SB 27 does not end 
with Article II. Even if SB 27 fell within the ambit of a state’s power 
to regulate elections, it may nevertheless have infringed upon the First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of candidates and voters. First and 
Fourteenth Amendment challenges to election laws generally involve 
the alleged infringement of three categories of rights: the First 
Amendment right to speech,48 the First Amendment right to 
association and belief,49 and the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal 
protection.50 For example, the Supreme Court has held restrictions on 
campaign expenditures to infringe upon a candidate’s First 
Amendment right to speech because they limit a candidate’s means for 
political communication.51 Additionally, the Court has found the 
disclosure of campaign contributions to overly burden voters’ First 
Amendment right to association when such disclosure results in actual 
harassment against voters over their support for unpopular 
campaigns.52 Finally, the Court has struck down election laws that 
disadvantage a class of candidates—by imposing discriminatory ballot 
 
 47. See Muller, supra note 44, at 68–69. 
 48. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”). The First Amendment right to speech was subsequently incorporated against the 
states in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 49. Although the right to association and belief is not explicitly mentioned in the First 
Amendment, the Court referenced such a right and applied it to the states in National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958). 
 50. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 51. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1976) (striking down portions of the Federal 
Elections Campaign Act that placed dollar limits on campaign expenditures); see also Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010) (invalidating portions of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act that limited independent corporate expenditures for 
electioneering communications). 
 52. See Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 101–02 (1982) 
(finding that the disclosure of the names and addresses of donors to the Socialist Workers party 
violated those donors’ associational rights in light of the well-documented instances of harassment 
against supporters of the Party); see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 792–93 (1983) 
(holding that Ohio’s early filing deadline for independent candidates unconstitutionally burdened 
the First Amendment right of voters to associate with the candidate of their choice); Patterson, 357 
U.S. at 462–63 (finding that Alabama’s attempt to compel the disclosure of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s (NAACP) membership list 
unconstitutionally burdened the associational rights of NAACP members). 
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designations,53 filing deadlines,54 signature requirements,55 and filing 
fees56—for violating that class of candidates’ Fourteenth Amendment 
right to equal protection. 
However, “not every limitation or incidental burden on [these 
rights] is subject to a stringent standard of review.”57 Anderson v. 
Celebrezze58 articulated a balancing test for courts to use when 
subjecting ballot access restrictions to First and Fourteenth 
Amendment scrutiny.59 Under this test, courts must weigh the 
“character and magnitude” of the First and Fourteenth Amendment 
burdens imposed by the law against the “legitimacy and strength” of 
the state’s interest in having it.60 The Court later reframed the same 
test in Burdick v. Takushi,61 holding that “when [First and Fourteenth 
Amendment] rights are subjected to ‘severe’ restrictions, the 
regulation must be ‘narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of 
compelling importance.’”62 “Lesser burdens, however, trigger less 
exacting review . . . .”63 
Ample disagreement exists as to how SB 27 would have fared 
under the Anderson-Burdick test. Some argue that any burden its 
disclosure requirements place on candidates would be minimal, since 
candidates have been disclosing tax returns for the better part of a 
century.64 Others note that some candidates have unique privacy 
interests that cannot be properly weighed by the courts.65 And it is not 
 
 53. See Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 403–04 (1964) (invalidating a Louisiana law 
requiring the designation of a candidate’s race on the ballot). 
 54. See Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 805–06 (invalidating Ohio’s early filing deadline for 
independent candidates). 
 55. See Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 183–87 (1979) 
(striking down an Illinois law requiring that independent and new party candidates for statewide 
offices obtain signatures totaling 5 percent of the votes cast in the prior election); Norman v. Reed, 
502 U.S. 279, 288–94 (1992) (striking down portions of a similar Illinois law); Williams v. Rhodes, 
393 U.S. 23, 24–25 (1968) (striking down an Ohio law requirement that a new party’s presidential 
nominee obtain signatures totaling 15 percent of the votes cast in the last gubernatorial election). 
 56. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (striking down a Texas statutory scheme 
requiring candidates to pay fees as high as $8,900). 
 57. Id. at 143. 
 58. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
 59. See id. at 789. 
 60. See id. 
 61. 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
 62. Id. at 434 (quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)). 
 63. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997) (citing Burdick, 504 
U.S. at 434). 
 64. See Lang, supra note 40, at 60. 
 65. See Muller, supra note 44, at 9 n.33. 
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difficult to imagine disagreements about the “legitimacy and strength” 
of the state’s interest in releasing a candidate’s tax returns. On the one 
hand, laws like SB 27 allow voters to make more intelligent decisions 
when choosing the next leader of the country.66 On the other hand, 
most serious candidates are already subject to intense media scrutiny, 
and voters are in any case free to draw inferences from a candidate’s 
refusal to release his or her tax returns.67 Some have additionally noted 
that disclosure may not provide the educational benefits touted by 
lawmakers—few voters may bother to educate themselves about 
candidate tax returns, and the information contained in candidate tax 
returns may distract voters from more important substantive issues.68 
Although the arguments enumerated above are far from 
comprehensive, they demonstrate that the constitutionality of laws like 
SB 27 remains uncertain absent a more definitive ruling by the 
Supreme Court. 
III.  IMPOSING CIVIL OR CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CANDIDATES WHO 
FAIL TO RELEASE THEIR TAX RETURNS 
SB 27 attempted to motivate the disclosure of tax returns by 
restricting access to the ballot.69 Although the California Supreme 
Court has since struck down SB 27,70 California can still incentivize 
disclosure by imposing civil or criminal penalties on those presidential 
candidates who fail to produce their tax returns. By avoiding the ballot, 
such an approach will not only sidestep challenges based on the 
California Constitution, it will likely bypass challenges based on the 
Qualifications Clause and withstand First and Fourteenth Amendment 
scrutiny as well. The remainder of this Part addresses each of the 
federal constitutional challenges in turn. 
 
 66. See S.B. 27, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
 67. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 797–98 (1983) (“Our cases reflect a greater 
faith in the ability of individual voters to inform themselves about campaign issues. . . . This 
reasoning applies with even greater force to a Presidential election, which receives more intense 
publicity.”). 
 68. See Lear Jiang, Note, Disclosure’s Last Stand? The Need to Clarify the “Informational 
Interest” Advanced by Campaign Finance Disclosure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 487, 501–06 (2019). 
 69. S.B. 27. 
 70. See Patterson v. Padilla, 451 P.3d 1171, 1191 (Cal. 2019). 
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A.  Qualifications Clause Challenge 
If laws like SB 27 violate the Presidential Qualifications Clause, 
it is because their denial of ballot access constitutes a disqualification 
of candidates for reasons other than those permitted by Article II.71 
However, California and other states can sidestep the Qualifications 
Clause issue altogether by civilly or criminally sanctioning the 
nondisclosure of tax returns instead of conditioning ballot access on 
their production. Although the Constitution fixes the qualifications for 
President and members of Congress,72 it permits states to punish 
behavior it neither spells out nor anticipates.73 In fact, the government 
has on a few occasions imprisoned those it could not otherwise 
disqualify from candidacy. In 1798, Representative Matthew Lyon 
was convicted for violating the Alien and Sedition Acts.74 Despite 
being sentenced to prison, Lyon was re-elected to Congress in a 
landslide vote while sitting inside his jail cell.75 Over a century later, 
in 1919, the Supreme Court upheld Eugene Debs’s conviction under 
the Espionage Act.76 Debs nevertheless ran for President while serving 
his ten-year prison sentence and received close to one million votes in 
the 1920 election.77 
The upshot is that even a law criminalizing a candidate’s refusal 
to release his or her tax returns will almost certainly withstand Article 
II scrutiny. The penalties imposed by such a law do not disqualify a 
candidate from the presidency—as history has demonstrated, one can 
still mount a successful campaign from prison. But more importantly, 
the Framers never intended the Presidential and Congressional 
Qualifications Clauses to serve as limitations to state police power. If 
the impediment of being in prison amounted to a disqualification from 
office in violation of the Qualifications Clauses, the constitutionality 
of every criminal code would be called into question. 
 
 71. See supra Part II.B. 
 72. See supra Part II.B. 
 73. U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”). 
 74. J. FAIRFAX MCLAUGHLIN, MATTHEW LYON: THE HAMPDEN OF CONGRESS, A 
BIOGRAPHY 357–58 (1900). 
 75. Lyon received 4,576 votes; his challenger received 2,444. Id. at 374–75. 
 76. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919). 
 77. Debs received 913,693 votes, the highest ever for a socialist candidate. RHODRI JEFFREYS-
JONES, THE AMERICAN LEFT: ITS IMPACT ON POLITICS AND SOCIETY SINCE 1900, at 35 (2013). 
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It might be argued that a better reading of the Qualifications 
Clauses would limit only those laws that single out political candidates 
for sanction while leaving untouched laws of general applicability that 
happen to ensnare those running for office. However, the Court has 
thus far refused to recognize such a distinction. For example, the Court 
has generally upheld the civil and criminal penalties imposed by the 
disclosure provisions of federal campaign finance laws—applicable 
only to candidates for federal office—without so much as a single 
mention of the Qualifications Clauses.78 And if the targeted imposition 
of civil or criminal penalties by Congress does not implicate the 
Qualifications Clauses, neither should the same by the states.79 
B.  First and Fourteenth Amendment Challenges 
Although a law that substitutes SB 27’s ballot removal with civil 
or criminal sanctions may avoid Qualifications Clause scrutiny, it 
remains susceptible to the same First and Fourteenth Amendment 
challenges. Because such a law still requires the disclosure of 
candidate tax returns, it may discourage charitable contributions and 
other associational activity revealed by the returns, or even deter 
candidates from running for office altogether. It therefore implicates 
what the Supreme Court has sometimes referred to as the First 
Amendment right to “privacy of association and belief.”80 
Nevertheless, the Court’s decisions upholding the mandatory 
disclosure of election-related information suggest that both SB 27 and 
its potential replacement would likely survive First and Fourteenth 
Amendment scrutiny.81 
 
 78. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60–68 (1976) (upholding the disclosure provisions 
of the Federal Election Campaign Act); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 
366–71 (2010) (upholding the disclosure provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act); 
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 230–31 (2003) (upholding earlier disclosure 
provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act), overruled in part on other grounds by Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Of course, the Supreme Court’s lack of 
commentary about the constitutionality of federal campaign finance laws under the Qualifications 
Clauses is not conclusive. Nevertheless, it suggests that even the attorneys seeking to overturn the 
statutes did not find the Qualifications Clause arguments persuasive enough to include in their 
briefs, and that the Court did not find the laws so obviously violative of the Qualifications Clauses 
as to raise the issue sua sponte. 
 79. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 80. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64. 
 81. This Note takes a different position than at least one federal district court, which found 
that SB 27 would likely have violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See Griffin v. Padilla, 
408 F. Supp. 3d 1169, 1181–85 (E.D. Cal. 2019), vacated, No. 2:19-cv-01477-MCE-DB, 2020 WL 
1442091 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2020). 
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1.  Campaign Finance Laws 
In analyzing the constitutionality of a law compelling the 
disclosure of candidate income tax returns, it is instructive to look at 
how the Supreme Court has considered, and ultimately upheld, the 
disclosure provisions of federal campaign finance laws.82 The most 
notable of these laws is the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). 
First enacted in 1972, it currently stands as the primary source of 
federal law regulating campaign spending and fundraising.83 Among 
other things, it requires candidates to report independent expenditures 
if they exceed $250 in a calendar year,84 and to disclose the names, 
addresses, and occupations of donors who contribute more than 
$200.85 These reports are subsequently made available to the public 
on a website.86 The FECA also established the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC)87 and gave it the authority to institute civil actions 
against those who fail to make the requisite disclosures.88 In addition 
to seeking injunctive relief, the FEC can impose civil penalties not 
exceeding “the greater of $5,000 or an amount equal to any 
contribution or expenditure involved in such violation.”89 In the case 
of a knowing or willful violation, the ceiling increases to “the greater 
of $10,000 or an amount equal to 200 percent of any contribution or 
expenditure involved in such violation.”90 In some instances, the FEC 
can even petition the court to impose criminal sanctions.91 
The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 
included a provision that allowed the disqualification of candidates for 
campaign finance violations.92 Tellingly, Congress repealed this 
 
 82. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 60–68 (upholding the disclosure provisions of the Federal 
Election Campaign Act); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–71 (upholding the disclosure provisions 
of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 230–31 (upholding earlier 
disclosure provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act). 
 83. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified 
as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–46). 
 84. 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(1) (2018). 
 85. Id. § 30104(c)(2). 
 86. Id. § 30104(i)(4). 
 87. Id. § 30106. 
 88. Id. § 30109(a)(6)(A). 
 89. Id. § 30109(a)(6)(B). 
 90. Id. § 30109(a)(6)(C). 
 91. Id. § 30109(a)(11). 
 92. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 407, 88 Stat. 
1263, 1290 (repealed by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
283, § 111, 90 Stat. 475, 486). 
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provision in 197693 before the Supreme Court had an opportunity to 
consider it, likely because of its dubious constitutionality.94 However, 
the Court has since affirmed the constitutionality of the remaining 
enforcement provisions of the FECA, including the authority of the 
FEC to impose civil and criminal sanctions for a candidate’s failure to 
file the requisite campaign finance disclosures.95 
a.  Buckley v. Valeo 
The Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of the 
FECA in Buckley v. Valeo.96 Although it struck down portions of the 
FECA that imposed hard limits on election-related expenditures made 
by candidates and their campaigns,97 the Court broadly upheld the 
FECA’s reporting requirements.98 The Court reasoned that 
expenditure ceilings impose a far greater burden on First Amendment 
political expression and associational rights than reporting 
requirements do.99 The former “necessarily reduces the quantity of 
expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of 
their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.”100 To the 
extent the latter does so, it does so indirectly.101 The Court therefore 
subjected the FECA’s expenditure limits to strict scrutiny102 while 
taking a more lenient approach to its reporting requirements.103 
This does not mean, however, that compelled disclosure is not 
subject to any scrutiny. Although mandating the disclosure of 
contributions and expenditures does not prohibit political expression 
or association in an absolute sense, it “can seriously infringe on 
 
 93. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976 § 111. 
 94. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 115 n.157, 137 n.175 (1976) (noting that candidate 
disqualification powers pose “very serious constitutional questions,” but that “[c]onsiderations of 
ripeness prevent us from deciding . . . whether such an agency could . . . disqualify a candidate for 
federal election consistently with Art. I, § 5, cl. 1”). 
 95. Id. at 76–82. 
 96. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 97. Id. at 51–59. 
 98. Id. at 143. 
 99. Id. at 44. 
 100. Id. at 19. 
 101. Id. at 64. 
 102. The Buckley Court used the words “exacting scrutiny.” Id. at 16. The Court later clarified 
that “exacting scrutiny” in the context of expenditure limits meant strict scrutiny. McCutcheon v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185, 197 (2014) (“Under exacting scrutiny, the Government may 
regulate protected speech only if such regulation promotes a compelling interest and is the least 
restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”). 
 103. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64. 
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privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.”104 Because campaign contributions “can reveal much 
about a person’s activities, associations, and beliefs,”105 their 
disclosure—although not an outright ban on the contributions 
themselves—may nevertheless deter some individuals from making 
contributions, thereby indirectly interfering with their First 
Amendment right to associate with the campaign of their choice.106 
Accordingly, the Buckley Court reaffirmed a form of intermediate 
scrutiny for mandatory disclosure laws, which “cannot be justified by 
a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest” and for 
which there must “be a ‘relevant correlation’ or ‘substantial relation’ 
between the governmental interest and the information required to be 
disclosed.”107 With respect to the FECA, the Court found three 
categories of government interest that justified its disclosure 
requirements.108 First, the disclosure requirements aid voters in their 
selection of a candidate by giving them insight into the source and uses 
of campaign money.109 Second, the disclosure requirements 
discourage corruption and the appearance of corruption by subjecting 
campaign finances to public scrutiny.110 Finally, the disclosure 
requirements are necessary for the government to be able to enforce 
the other provisions of the FECA.111 
In closing out its analysis of the FECA, the Court asserted that the 
disclosure provisions were not only substantially related to the 
government interests enumerated above, they were “in most 
applications . . . the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of 
campaign ignorance and corruption.”112 Although opponents of the 
FECA had proposed a rule requiring post-election disclosure by 
successful candidates as a less restrictive alternative, the Court 
dismissed the proposal as being ineffective at educating voters prior 
to the election when “public interest in sources of campaign funds is 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 66 (quoting Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78–79 (1974) (Powell, J., 
concurring)). 
 106. Id. at 68. 
 107. Id. at 64. 
 108. Id. at 66. 
 109. Id. at 67 (“It allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely 
than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches.”). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 67–68. 
 112. Id. at 68. 
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likely to be at its peak.”113 Because the Court concluded that the FECA 
reporting requirements served important government interests, not 
least of which was the electorate’s interest in knowing “where political 
campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candidate,”114 
the Court found them constitutional.115 
However, the Court was careful to note that its decision in 
Buckley did not mean that the FECA reporting requirements were 
necessarily constitutional in all their applications.116 For example, 
compelling disclosure from a minor-party candidate when such 
disclosure would subject minor-party contributors to “threats, 
harassment, or reprisals” may more directly abridge the contributors’ 
First Amendment associational rights.117 In such instances, disclosure 
might serve as a practical bar to the contributors’ ability to donate to 
the party of their choice.118 Nevertheless, the Court found these 
concerns sufficiently remote so as not to facially invalidate compelled 
disclosure laws that failed to carve out exceptions for minor-party 
candidates and was satisfied that the lower courts could adequately 
address the constitutional issues in such cases as they arose.119 
b.  Defining the Limits of Buckley 
The Buckley decision upholding the FECA’s disclosure 
provisions relied on two important findings. First, that the disclosure 
provisions, unlike the FECA’s expenditure limits, only indirectly 
burdened the First Amendment rights of candidates and their donors 
and therefore triggered a more lenient form of scrutiny.120 And second, 
that the disclosure provisions satisfied scrutiny by being substantially 
related to serving important government interests.121 Even as the 
Supreme Court has reaffirmed its decision in Buckley,122 it has 
 
 113. Id. at 68 n.82. 
 114. Id. at 66 (citation omitted). 
 115. Id. at 61. 
 116. See id. at 74. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 73–74. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 64. 
 121. Id. at 68 (“The disclosure requirements, as a general matter, directly serve substantial 
governmental interests.”). 
 122. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 366–71 (2010) 
(upholding the disclosure provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act); McConnell v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 230–31 (2003) (upholding earlier disclosure provisions of the 
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subsequently invalidated some disclosure laws as lacking in one or the 
other of these justifications.123 
The Buckley Court opened the door to the invalidation of 
mandatory disclosure laws that encroach too far on protected First 
Amendment interests,124 and the Court subsequently walked through 
that door in Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Committee 
(Ohio).125 There, an Ohio law required political parties to report the 
names and addresses of every campaign contributor and every 
recipient of a campaign disbursement.126 As such, it did not differ 
materially from the FECA.127 Nevertheless, the Court held the 
reporting requirements unconstitutional as applied to the Socialist 
Workers Party (SWP).128 Evidence presented at trial documented a 
long history of both private and government hostility towards the 
SWP.129 The former involved numerous instances of threatening 
phone calls, hate mail, and the firing of SWP members because of their 
party affiliation.130 The latter involved pervasive surveillance of SWP 
members by various government agencies, and the disclosure of 
embarrassing information about SWP members to the press.131 
Relying primarily on its reasoning in Buckley, the Court held that 
because there existed a “reasonable probability” that disclosure would 
subject SWP contributors and recipients to “threats, harassment, or 
reprisals,” Ohio’s disclosure laws could not be constitutionally applied 
to the SWP.132 
Even when there is no reason to believe that disclosure would lead 
to “threats, harassment, or reprisals,” the Court has found legislation 
unconstitutional for lacking a substantial relation to its stated 
 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act), overruled in part on other grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 123. See Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87 (1982), 
discussed infra; Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999), discussed infra. 
 124. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74. 
 125. 459 U.S. 87 (1982). 
 126. Id. at 88. 
 127. It was argued that the Ohio statute’s lack of a monetary threshold, in contrast to the FECA, 
should render the statute facially invalid. However, the district court punted on the issue. Id. at 91 
n.6. 
 128. Id. at 88. 
 129. Id. at 99. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 101–02. 
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government interests.133 In Colorado, citizens can enact laws through 
ballot measures that have garnered a minimum number of supporting 
signatures.134 It is therefore common for proponents of ballot measures 
to hire petition circulators to solicit signatures.135 In an attempt to 
regulate signature solicitation activities, Colorado passed a law 
requiring the disclosure of the names, addresses, and salaries of paid 
petition circulators.136 But in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law 
Foundation, Inc.,137 the Court ruled the law unconstitutional, not 
because it could reasonably lead to the harassment of petition 
circulators,138 but because it failed scrutiny.139 
The Court acknowledged that disclosure generally serves 
important government interests, observing that “informed public 
opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment.”140 
However, the Court found Colorado’s interest in disclosure to be 
adequately served by existing law requiring proponents of ballot 
measures—rather than the petition circulators they hire—to report 
their names and the amount of money they spent to gather 
signatures.141 After all, “[w]hat is of interest is the payor, not the 
payees.”142 The Court further dismissed concerns that paid petition 
circulators may accept false signatures, reasoning that they would 
have less incentive to do so than non-paid petition circulators who 
were not subject to the disclosure requirement.143 Because the sweep 
of the Colorado provision was simultaneously too broad—
unnecessarily including paid petition circulators when the inclusion of 
ballot measure proponents would suffice—and too narrow—failing to 
 
 133. See Buckley v. Am. Const. L. Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 204 (1999), discussed infra. 
 134. Id. at 186. 
 135. See id. at 194. 
 136. See id. at 186. 
 137. 525 U.S. 182 (1999). 
 138. The disclosure of the names, addresses, and salaries of petition circulators “are not 
instantly accessible” and therefore “does not expose the circulator to the risk of ‘heat of the 
moment’ harassment.” Id. at 199. 
 139. Id. at 204. 
 140. Id. at 202 (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936)). 
 141. Id. at 202–03. 
 142. Id. at 203 (quoting Am. Const. L. Found., Inc. v. Meyer, 870 F. Supp. 995, 1003 (D. Colo. 
1994), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 120 F.3d 1092 (10th Cir. 1997)). 
 143. “[W]e are not prepared to assume that a professional circulator—whose qualifications for 
similar future assignments may well depend on a reputation for competence and integrity—is any 
more likely to accept false signatures than a volunteer who is motivated entirely by an interest in 
having the proposition placed on the ballot.” Id. at 203–04 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 
426 (1988)). 
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include non-paid petition circulators who might have more incentive 
to obtain false signatures—the Court struck it down for being too 
“tenuously related to the substantial interests disclosure serves.”144 
In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,145 the Court struck 
down a disclosure law both because it overly burdened the First 
Amendment rights of ordinary citizens and because it failed to serve 
important state interests.146 There, Margaret McIntyre was fined for 
distributing anonymous leaflets protesting a proposed school tax147 in 
contravention of an Ohio statute prohibiting the distribution of 
“unsigned documents designed to influence voters in an election.”148 
The Court took several steps to distinguish this case from Buckley.149 
First, whereas the disclosure law in Buckley required the 
attachment of names to campaign contributions, the Ohio law required 
the attachment of names to all election-related documents, including, 
in this instance, “a personally crafted statement of a political 
viewpoint.”150 While “money may ‘talk,’” the speech communicated 
by a campaign contribution is “less specific, less personal, and less 
provocative than a handbill.”151 There is therefore less of a risk that 
campaign donation attributions will significantly impact donors.152 On 
the other hand, because leaflets like the ones passed out by McIntyre 
may express unpopular viewpoints and are therefore much more likely 
to “precipitate retaliation,” the Ohio law infringed upon McIntyre’s 
free speech rights to an impermissible degree.153 
Second, while disclosure of campaign contributions lessens the 
risk that the contributions will be used to solicit special treatment after 
a candidate assumes office,154 disclosure of campaign literature 
 
 144. Id. at 204. 
 145. 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
 146. See id. at 357. 
 147. Id. at 337–38. 
 148. Id. at 344. 
 149. Id. at 355–56. 
 150. Id. at 355. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. 
 153. See id. Presumably, the Court was also sympathetic to the fact that McIntyre had only 
“modest resources” at her disposal. See id. at 350. The Court has since upheld a provision of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act requiring anyone funding televised electioneering 
communications to include the disclaimer “_______ is responsible for the content of this 
advertising.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010) (quoting 2 
U.S.C. § 441d(d)(2) (2000) (transferred to 52 U.S.C. § 30120(d)(2) (2012))). 
 154. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 356. 
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authorship serves no similar government interest.155 Although the 
Court acknowledged Ohio’s stated interest in preventing fraud and 
libel, it noted that Ohio’s Election Code already penalized the 
dissemination of false statements during political campaigns.156 
Accordingly, the law in question only provided the ancillary benefits 
of further deterring fraud and aiding the enforcement of the Election 
Code.157 These benefits, while “assuredly legitimate,” were not 
sufficiently important to justify the law’s burden on political 
speech.158 
Taken as a whole, these cases suggest that the government may 
generally compel the disclosure of election-related information unless 
doing so would subject individuals to a more than hypothetical 
possibility of retaliation, or if such disclosure does not substantially 
relate to the accomplishment of important government interests—
typically voter education and the deterrence of corruption or its 
appearance.159 
2.  More Comprehensive Financial Disclosure Laws 
The cases discussed above establish a framework for analyzing 
reporting requirements as applied to election-related activity, but they 
fail to address the constitutionality of laws requiring the disclosure of 
personal financial information that predates a candidate’s decision to 
run for office. Indeed, the Court has thus far eschewed ruling on laws 
requiring public officials to disclose a broader range of non-campaign-
related finances. 
The most prominent of these more comprehensive disclosure 
laws is the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (EGA).160 Among other 
things, the EGA requires the President and Vice President to publicly 
report their sources of income, gifts they have received, property they 
hold, the value of their total liabilities, and their sale and exchange of 
real property or securities.161 These reports must be filed within thirty 
 
 155. Id. at 357. 
 156. Id. at 349. 
 157. Id. at 350–51. 
 158. Id. at 351. 
 159. See supra Part III.B.1.a. 
 160. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. app. 4). 
 161. 5 U.S.C. app. 4 §§ 101(f), 102(a), 103(d) (2018). 
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days of assuming office162 and on an annual basis thereafter.163 
Although the constitutionality of these particular provisions has yet to 
be seriously challenged in federal court, the Fifth Circuit in Duplantier 
v. United States164 upheld other EGA provisions requiring federal 
judges, their spouses, and their dependent children to file and make 
public similar financial reports.165 The Fifth Circuit based its 
reasoning primarily on its prior decision in Plante v. Gonzalez.166 
a.  Plante v. Gonzalez 
In Plante v. Gonzalez, the Fifth Circuit upheld the “Sunshine 
Amendment” to the Florida Constitution.167 The amendment states in 
relevant part: 
All elected constitutional officers and candidates for such 
offices and, as may be determined by law, other public 
officers, candidates, and employees shall file full and public 
disclosure of their financial interests. . . . Full and public 
disclosure of financial interests shall mean filing with the 
custodian of state records by July 1 of each year a sworn 
statement showing net worth and identifying each asset and 
liability in excess of $1,000 and its value together with one 
of the following: 
a. A copy of the person’s most recent federal income tax 
return; or 
b. A sworn statement which identifies each separate 
source and amount of income which exceeds $1,000.168 
In its analysis, the Fifth Circuit first declined to find that the 
Florida amendment’s compelled financial disclosure infringed on any 
“fundamental” right.169 It noted that the rights the Supreme Court has 
traditionally classified as “fundamental” have all involved interests in 
important and intimate decision-making.170 Although financial 
disclosure may indirectly affect some of the decisions one might 
 
 162. Id. § 101(a). 
 163. Id. § 101(d). 
 164. 606 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 165. Id. at 657. 
 166. 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978); see Duplantier, 606 F.2d at 669–71. 
 167. Plante, 575 F.2d at 1121–22. 
 168. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8. 
 169. Plante, 575 F.2d at 1132. 
 170. See id. at 1128. 
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make, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the impacted decisions are 
typically not as important or intimate as the ones the Supreme Court 
has protected171—for example, the decision to use contraceptives,172 
to terminate a pregnancy,173 to marry,174 to live with family,175 or to 
control the upbringing of one’s children.176 Moreover, even when 
disclosure does affect important and intimate decision-making, the 
Fifth Circuit declared its influence too incidental to pose a 
constitutional problem.177 
The Supreme Court had considered the secondary effects of 
disclosure in two prior cases. In Planned Parenthood of Central 
Missouri v. Danforth,178 the Court upheld abortion-related reporting 
requirements over objections that it discouraged women from 
exercising their right to terminate their pregnancies.179 And in Whalen 
v. Roe,180 the Court upheld a drug prescription recordkeeping system 
over objections that it would dissuade some from making decisions 
important to their medical care.181 The Fifth Circuit concluded that 
because the Sunshine Amendment did little more to deter the exercise 
of a fundamental right than the provisions in Danforth or Whalen, it 
did not demand strict scrutiny.182 
However, the Fifth Circuit recognized a constitutionally protected 
interest in “avoiding disclosure of personal matters” apart from the 
ancillary effects such disclosure might have on decision-making.183 
Although the Supreme Court in Whalen seemed to disclaim a 
generalized interest in privacy by permitting the recording of the 
names and addresses of patients in a state-controlled computer 
 
 171. See id. 
 172. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 173. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833 (1992). 
 174. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Obergefell v. Hodges, 567 U.S. 644 (2015). 
 175. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 176. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 177. Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1131 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 178. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
 179. Id. at 79. 
 180. 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
 181. Id. at 602–04. 
 182. Plante, 575 F.2d at 1131–32. The Sunshine Amendment has an arguably greater deterrent 
effect than the laws in Danforth and Whalen because unlike those laws, it requires the relevant 
disclosures be made accessible to the public. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit is likely correct in 
finding that any increased deterrence resulting from public disclosure is unlikely to trigger strict 
scrutiny under the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence. 
 183. Id. at 1132–34. 
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database without applying any form of heightened scrutiny,184 the 
Fifth Circuit distinguished Whalen from the circumstances in 
Plante.185 The Court in Whalen had dismissed concerns over privacy 
in large part because public disclosure of the information stored in the 
database was prohibited186 and the possibility of unauthorized access 
was unlikely.187 But when, as in Plante, a case involves the disclosure 
of personal information to the public—as opposed to state 
employees—the Fifth Circuit determined that the larger intrusion to 
privacy demanded some form of scrutiny.188 The court feared that any 
other interpretation of privacy rights would result in the unwelcome 
potential for Florida’s public disclosure requirements to be “extended 
to anyone, in any situation.”189 
The Fifth Circuit eventually decided that the constitutionality of 
the Sunshine Amendment was best determined by “comparing the 
interests it serves with those it hinders.”190 In assessing the 
government’s interests, the court pointed to four important goals 
similar to the ones laid out in Buckley: “the public’s ‘right to know’ an 
official’s interests, deterrence of corruption and conflicting interests, 
creation of public confidence in Florida’s officials, and assistance in 
detecting and prosecuting officials who have violated the law.”191 The 
court subsequently found the Florida amendment to sufficiently 
promote the first three of these goals.192 
In addressing the interests of candidates and public officials, the 
court acknowledged that in some situations financial disclosure may 
lead to “the threat of kidnapping, the irritation of solicitations, [or] the 
embarrassment of poverty.”193 Presumably, a showing of a legitimate 
threat of kidnapping would result in a successful as-applied challenge. 
But as a general matter, the court held these concerns insufficient to 
overcome the government’s interests in enacting the amendment, in 
part because public officials and those running for public office have 
 
 184. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598 (“[T]he legislature’s enactment of the patient-identification 
requirement was a reasonable exercise of New York’s broad police powers.”). 
 185. Plante, 575 F.2d at 1133. 
 186. Id. (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 593–95). 
 187. Id. (citing Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602). 
 188. Id. at 1134. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 1134–35. 
 193. Id. at 1135 (citing City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 466 P.2d 225, 233 (Cal. 1970)). 
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less of an expectation of privacy,194 and in part because “regulations 
might allow exemptions in sensitive situations.”195 Because the Fifth 
Circuit found the balancing test to tilt in Florida’s favor, it deemed the 
Sunshine Amendment constitutional.196 
b.  State and lower federal court decisions on financial disclosure 
Financial disclosure laws similar to the EGA and Florida’s 
Sunshine Amendment have worked their way through various state 
and lower federal courts.197 The majority of these cases have upheld 
financial disclosure laws as applied to public officials,198 but not all of 
them have arrived at their conclusions in the same way. 
In Hunter v. City of New York,199 a New York state court found 
that because a city financial disclosure ordinance200 did not implicate 
a constitutional right, “the test is whether the means employed . . . are 
‘reasonable and appropriate’ to accomplish its legitimate purposes.”201 
Unsurprisingly, the court held the ordinance constitutional under this 
lenient form of review even in “the absence of administrative 
machinery to review the propriety of public disclosure in individual 
cases.”202 However, while the state appellate court agreed that the law 
did not infringe on any constitutional right to privacy, it held that the 
law violated the Due Process Clause by not considering “claims of 
irrelevancy.”203 Although the law in most cases served legitimate 
government purposes, its flaw was in its failure to provide state 
employees the opportunity to argue that, as applied to them, the law’s 
disclosure requirement bore no relationship to these purposes.204 
 
 194. For example, “[t]he salaries of most officials, including federal judges, are matters of 
public record.” Id. at 1136. 
 195. Id. at 1137. 
 196. Id. at 1138. 
 197. See id. at 1124 n.8 (listing the rulings on disclosure laws in fourteen states). 
 198. See id. at 1136 n.26 (listing cases from a “majority of courts” holding that “mandatory 
financial disclosure for elected officials is constitutional”). 
 199. 391 N.Y.S.2d 289 (N.Y. Special Term 1976), aff’d as modified, 396 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1977), aff’d, 376 N.E.2d 928 (N.Y. 1978) (mem.). 
 200. Id. at 297. The ordinance required officials and their spouses to report any income from a 
single source exceeding $1,000, any gifts exceeding $500, any debts exceeding $5,000 over a 
ninety-day period, and any investment whose value exceeded $20,000. Id. at 294. 
 201. Id. at 297. 
 202. Id. at 301. 
 203. See Hunter v. City of New York, 396 N.Y.S.2d 186, 189–90 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977), aff’d, 
376 N.E.2d 928 (N.Y. 1978) (mem.). 
 204. See id. at 189 (“The State must provide appropriate procedures to avoid arbitrary or 
discriminatory results, even where it asserts a legitimate governmental interest.”). 
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In Slevin v. City of New York,205 a district court enjoined 
enforcement of a newer version of the same financial disclosure law, 
but for different reasons.206 It found the law to implicate “fundamental 
interests,” including “the right to privacy, in its many facets, financial, 
marital, familial . . . and freedom of association, of belief, and of 
speech.”207 The court reasoned that such interests “should be justified 
by at least substantial and perhaps compelling state interests” and 
should be “narrowly drawn to deal only with the legitimate state 
interests at stake.”208 The court additionally took issue with the fact 
that the law still “provide[d] no mechanism by which reporting 
employees may be spared from reporting any item arguably required 
to be disclosed.”209 
Slevin’s description of privacy rights as “fundamental” and its use 
of language typically associated with strict scrutiny is somewhat of an 
anomaly. By and large, courts have refrained from applying strict 
scrutiny to financial disclosure laws.210 Nevertheless, courts seem to 
be more willing to find such laws constitutional when they provide a 
means by which some portions of financial disclosures can be 
redacted.211 Although Slevin was not explicitly overturned, the Second 
Circuit later upheld a third version of the same law that permitted 
individuals to withhold items from their financial disclosure reports 
when “public inspection would constitute an unwarranted invasion of 
privacy.”212 The court acknowledged that “public disclosure of 
financial information may be personally embarrassing and highly 
intrusive,” but determined that “the statute’s privacy mechanism 
adequately protects plaintiffs’ constitutional privacy interests.”213 
Courts have also been sensitive to the scope of financial 
disclosure laws. In City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young,214 the 
 
 205. 477 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
 206. See id. at 1052–53. 
 207. Id. at 1055. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 1054. 
 210. See Louis Bernard Jack, Constitutional Aspects of Financial Disclosure Under the Ethics 
in Government Act, 30 CATH. U. L. REV. 583, 586 (1981). 
 211. See Slevin, 477 F. Supp. at 1054. 
 212. Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1557 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 213. Id. at 1561. Beyond stating that the statute’s privacy mechanism was sufficient to ensure 
the law’s constitutionality, the Second Circuit did not indicate whether it would have upheld the 
statute’s original formulation in Slevin, or what the appropriate level of scrutiny should be. 
 214. 466 P.2d 225 (Cal. 1970). 
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California Supreme Court found a financial disclosure law215 to be 
overly broad because it applied to every public officer and candidate 
for state or local office, as well as their spouses and minor children.216 
The court decried the fact that “[n]o effort [was] made to relate the 
disclosure to financial dealings or assets which might be expected to 
give rise to a conflict of interest.”217 In a subsequent case, the 
California Supreme Court upheld a disclosure law218 because it 
contained “sufficient assurances that unnecessary intrusions into 
personal privacy will not occur.”219 In particular, the law was 
“applicable only to certain designated officials” and exempted from 
disclosure any interest that could not be materially affected by an 
official’s actions while in office.220 
It is unclear how the U.S. Supreme Court would rule on similar 
financial disclosure laws today. The majority of the state and lower 
court cases considering these laws rely on a general interest in 
informational privacy that the Court has yet to fully acknowledge or 
disclaim.221 Moreover, Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,222 
the last Supreme Court case to directly address the “individual interest 
in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,”223 was, like many of the 
aforementioned cases, decided over forty years ago.224 However, if 
Nixon can serve as a guide, the Court is likely to be sensitive to the 
same issues discussed above. In Nixon, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of the Presidential Recordings and Materials 
Preservation Act, which directed the government to take custody of 
presidential materials accumulated during the Nixon presidency in 
order to preserve documents that had historical value and to make 
 
 215. The law required the disclosure of all investments valued in excess of $10,000. Id. at 232. 
 216. See id. at 232–33. 
 217. Id. at 232. 
 218. The law required the disclosure of investments worth more than $1,000, real property 
worth more than $1,000, each source of income or gift worth more than $250, and employment in 
the prior year. County of Nevada v. MacMillen, 522 P.2d 1345, 1348 (Cal. 1974). 
 219. Id. at 1350. 
 220. Id. at 1348. 
 221. See Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 146–47 (2011) 
(acknowledging the dearth of case law on the matter, but nevertheless declining to rule on the 
existence of a general right to informational privacy). 
 222. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
 223. Id. at 457 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)). 
 224. See Nelson, 562 U.S. at 146 (“The Court announced the decision in Nixon in the waning 
days of October Term 1976. Since then, the Court has said little else on the subject of an ‘individual 
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.’ . . . [And] no other decision has squarely 
addressed a constitutional right to informational privacy.” (quoting Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599)). 
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other records available for use in judicial proceedings.225 The Court 
acknowledged that some of the materials in question might be personal 
in nature, and that “public officials, including the President, are not 
wholly without constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of 
personal life unrelated to any acts done by them in their public 
capacity.”226 Nevertheless, the Court found the Act constitutional in 
part because it set clear limits on disclosure.227 In particular, the Act 
required government archivists with “an unblemished record for 
discretion”228 to prescreen the presidential materials and immediately 
return any documents they flagged as “purely private.”229 
While the boundary between laws that are too broad and those 
that are sufficiently tailored is hardly clear and sometimes 
inconsistent, a few themes stand out. First, courts have been more 
amenable to laws that place some limits on disclosure. This might take 
the form of administrative processes that allow affected persons to 
withhold sensitive information230 or information bearing no 
connection to their official duties.231 Many courts, however, set an 
even lower bar, finding adequate “minimum dollar limits on revelation 
of some of the assets and liabilities.”232 Second, courts are more likely 
to uphold disclosure laws that extend only to a well-defined and 
reasonable set of persons. In particular, courts prefer statutes that 
apply only to higher public offices where the risk and consequence of 
corruption is greater and the government interest is correspondingly 
higher.233 Finally, courts have for the most part acknowledged that it 
 
 225. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 433–36. 
 226. Id. at 457. 
 227. Id. at 454. 
 228. Id. at 462 (quoting Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 406 F. Supp. 321, 365 (D.D.C. 1976), 
aff’d, 433 U.S. 425 (1977)). 
 229. Id. at 458–59. 
 230. See S.B. 27, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (requiring the redaction of social security 
numbers, home addresses, telephone numbers, and medical information on submitted tax returns). 
 231. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458–59 (stating that the Presidential Recordings and Materials 
Preservation Act required the government to return to President Nixon all “purely private papers 
and recordings”). 
 232. Lehrhaupt v. Flynn, 356 A.2d 35, 43 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976), aff’d, 383 A.2d 428 
(N.J. 1978) (mem.). 
 233. See, e.g., Gideon v. Ala. State Ethics Comm’n, 379 So. 2d 570, 575 (Ala. 1980) (upholding 
a disclosure requirement for officials who make more than $15,000 annually); Hunter v. City of 
New York, 391 N.Y.S.2d 289, 302–03 (N.Y. Special Term 1976) (upholding a disclosure 
requirement for officials earning more than $25,000 annually), aff’d as modified, 396 N.Y.S.2d 186 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1977), aff’d, 376 N.E.2d 928 (N.Y. 1978) (mem.); 5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 101(f) (2018) 
(requiring disclosure from a defined set of officials, including those in a position classified as GS-
15 or above). But see Comer v. City of Mobile, 337 So. 2d 742, 752–53 (Ala. 1976) (finding a 
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would be “an insurmountable legislative task to tailor disclosures to 
each of literally a myriad of public posts, and an anomaly to require 
each individual to make a personal determination as to what items of 
his financial affairs would be relevant.”234 Therefore, the consensus 
among the courts has been that disclosure laws need not use the least 
restrictive means for achieving compelling government interests.235 
3.  Applying the Anderson-Burdick Test 
Although the Supreme Court established the Anderson-Burdick 
test as a means for evaluating ballot access legislation rather than 
disclosure laws, the test in many ways epitomizes the reasoning in 
both Plante and Buckley. The initial formulation in Anderson 
resembles the balancing test put forward by the Fifth Circuit in Plante, 
requiring courts to weigh “the character and magnitude of the asserted 
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments” against “the precise interests put forward by the State 
as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.”236 More recent 
formulations based on Burdick parallel the logic in Buckley, where 
“[r]egulations imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs’ rights must be 
narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest,” and 
“[l]esser burdens . . . trigger less exacting review.”237 In Buckley, the 
Court applied strict scrutiny to hard limits on campaign expenditures 
because they severely burdened candidates’ First Amendment right to 
speech.238 But the Court only applied intermediate scrutiny to 
campaign finance disclosure requirements because they imposed a 
lesser burden on donors’ First Amendment right to association.239 
And even though the Fifth Circuit in Plante arrived at a balancing 
test based on an ostensible constitutional interest in informational 
privacy, the path it took to get there nevertheless bears a striking 
resemblance to the approach taken in Buckley and formalized in 
Burdick. The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the submission of 
financial records to the government generally imposes so little of a 
 
disclosure ordinance that applied only to officials in cities with populations greater than 15,000 
“arbitrary and capricious”). 
 234. Fritz v. Gorton, 517 P.2d 911, 926 (Wash. 1974). 
 235. See Jack, supra note 210, at 586. 
 236. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
 237. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997) (citing Burdick v. 
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)). 
 238. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 239. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976). 
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privacy burden that it warrants no more than rational basis review.240 
But because the release of financial records to the public is particularly 
invasive, the court reasoned that public disclosure requires 
“[s]omething more than mere rationality.”241 On the other hand, 
because the Supreme Court has not recognized a generalized 
fundamental right to privacy, and because the Florida amendment did 
not impose a severe burden to the types of “fundamental” personal 
decision-making the Supreme Court has recognized, the Fifth Circuit 
did not find the amendment to warrant the most exacting of scrutiny.242 
The resulting standard established by the Fifth Circuit therefore falls 
somewhere between rational basis review and strict scrutiny.243 
a.  Standard of review 
The logic of Anderson-Burdick can similarly be applied to a law 
imposing civil or criminal sanctions on presidential candidates who 
fail to disclose their tax returns. Under Anderson-Burdick, an election 
law deserves strict scrutiny only if it severely burdens the rights of 
candidates or voters.244 Here, the disclosure of tax returns infringes no 
more on a candidate’s First Amendment right to speech than does the 
disclosure of campaign-related finances under the FECA. Neither 
requirement imposes a “ceiling on campaign-related activities”245 or 
“prevent[s] anyone from speaking.”246 To the extent that they affect 
First Amendment speech rights, they do so indirectly.247 Because 
disclosure generally does not limit association, belief, or important 
and intimate decision-making in an absolute sense, the burdens it 
 
 240. See Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1133 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 241. Id. at 1134. 
 242. See id. at 1131–32. 
 243. See id. at 1134 (describing a balancing test). 
 244. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (“[T]he rigorousness of our inquiry into 
the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation 
burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. . . . [W]hen those rights are subjected to ‘severe’ 
restrictions, ‘the regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling 
importance.’ . . . But when a state election law provision imposes only ‘reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, ‘the 
State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions.” (first 
quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992); and then quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 
U.S. 780, 788 (1983))). 
 245. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976). 
 246. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 247. See supra Part III.B.1.a. 
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imposes do not rise to a level “severe” enough to warrant strict 
scrutiny. 
However, even if disclosure laws do not absolutely bar First 
Amendment activities, they nevertheless place some burden on the 
First Amendment right to “privacy of association and belief.”248 In 
Buckley, the Court applied intermediate scrutiny to the FECA’s 
reporting requirements after acknowledging that the disclosure of 
campaign contributions may in some instances deter associational 
activity—i.e., donations—that might otherwise have occurred if it 
could have been conducted in private.249 Here, disclosure places an 
analogous burden on candidates. Tax returns may reveal association 
through employment, belief through charitable donations, and other 
information that might burden a candidate’s First Amendment rights. 
For example, an individual who entertains the idea of running for 
office may think twice about donating to unpopular political or 
religious organizations. And even if a candidate’s tax returns reveal 
nothing political or religious in nature, the Court has made clear that 
“it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by 
association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural 
matters, . . . state action which may have the effect of curtailing the 
freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.”250 
Furthermore, the disclosure of tax returns may deter some from 
running for office. Although the Court has not “attached such 
fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of 
review,” it has recognized that “the rights of voters and the rights of 
candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation.”251 The Court 
has therefore struck down laws that overly burden candidacy, 
including early filing deadlines,252 minimum signature 
requirements,253 and exorbitant filing fees.254 Admittedly, the 
disclosure of tax returns does not interfere as directly with candidacy 
as a filing fee. But the burden it places on candidacy is of the same 
 
 248. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64. 
 249. Id. at 68 (“[P]ublic disclosure of contributions to candidates and political parties will deter 
some individuals who otherwise might contribute.”). 
 250. Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 
449, 460–61 (1958). 
 251. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142–43 (1972). 
 252. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 805–06 (1983). 
 253. See Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 183–87 (1979); 
Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288–94 (1992); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 24–25 (1968). 
 254. See Bullock, 405 U.S. at 134–35. 
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kind and quality as the burden FECA campaign contribution reports 
place on donors. Both burden core political activity. The FECA does 
so by deterring individuals from contributing to campaigns, and the 
proposed law does so by deterring individuals from running for office. 
Consequently, under the Court’s reasoning in Buckley, courts should 
apply intermediate scrutiny to a law compelling the disclosure of tax 
returns by presidential candidates. 
Not all courts have utilized this line of reasoning to apply 
heightened scrutiny. The Fifth Circuit based its decision in Plante on 
a more expansive view of a constitutionally protected right to 
privacy.255 Although the court might have saved itself a lot of trouble 
by recognizing, in the vein of Buckley, that “financial disclosure laws 
[impinge upon the] freedom of association, of belief, and of 
speech,”256 it nevertheless arrived at the same result. Despite 
eventually settling on a balancing test, the court utilized language 
echoing intermediate scrutiny. Of Florida’s interests, the court wrote 
that “[t]he importance of these goals cannot be denied.”257 And of the 
relation between the Florida amendment and these interests, the court 
stated that disclosure “should help,” and that “more effective methods 
are not obvious.”258 
Although the Supreme Court has yet to adopt as broad a view of 
the right to privacy as the Fifth Circuit, it need not do so to find that 
the disclosure of tax returns burdens the “privacy of association and 
belief”259—a right it has recognized—to an extent warranting some 
scrutiny. As was the case with the FECA’s reporting requirement and 
Florida’s Sunshine Amendment, a law penalizing the failure of 
candidates to produce relevant financial information neither burdens a 
fundamental right so severely as to warrant strict scrutiny, nor imposes 
so little a burden on candidates—and by extension, the voters that 
support them—as to deserve only the simple courtesy of rational basis 
review. Indeed, the weight of the reasoning in Buckley, Plante, and 
other decisions by state and lower federal courts indicate that the 
appropriate standard with which to evaluate the compelled disclosure 
law is one of intermediate scrutiny. 
 
 255. See supra Part III.B.2.a. 
 256. Slevin v. City of New York, 477 F. Supp. 1051, 1055 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
 257. Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 258. Id. at 1135. 
 259. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976). 
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b.  Applying intermediate scrutiny 
To satisfy intermediate scrutiny, a law compelling the release of 
candidate tax returns must be substantially related to serving an 
important government interest.260 Both Buckley and Plante identified 
three important government interests: voter education, the deterrence 
of corruption or its appearance, and the detection of violations of the 
law.261 The proposed law need only substantially relate to one of these 
interests. 
The most obvious reason for requiring the release of candidate tax 
returns is voter education. The Buckley Court stated that disclosure of 
“[t]he sources of a candidate’s financial support . . . alert the voter to 
the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and 
thus facilitate predictions of future performance in office.”262 Income 
tax returns are similar to campaign contributions in this way. Because 
both reveal the sources of a candidate’s financial support, both identify 
sources of candidate interest and potential conflicts of interest. A 
President whose campaign is supported mostly by farmers may be 
inclined to support policies benefiting farmers; a President who 
derives most of his or her income from agricultural businesses would 
likely have the same inclinations.263 In fact, because candidates are 
likely to be more sensitive to issues impacting their own sources of 
income than they are to those affecting their donors, the disclosure of 
income tax returns arguably does a better job educating voters about 
the issues “to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive.”264 
An equally if not more important government interest is the 
deterrence of corruption or its appearance. The Buckley Court upheld 
the FECA in part because its “disclosure requirements deter actual 
corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing large 
 
 260. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (describing an “intermediate” level of 
scrutiny when analyzing the constitutionality of gender classifications). 
 261. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–68; Plante, 575 F.2d at 1134. 
 262. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67. 
 263. Although candidates typically relinquish control of their businesses and equitable holdings 
upon assuming office, mere possession of income-generating assets can influence a candidate’s 
decisions. For example, although President Trump claims to have resigned from his positions in 
400 business entities, his ownership stake in many of these entities may still influence his policy 
decisions as President. Resignation Letter from Donald J. Trump, President of the U.S. (Jan. 19, 
2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3404759/DJT-Resignation-Signature-Page-
With-Exhibit-a.pdf. 
 264. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67. 
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contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity.”265 Of 
particular concern was the possibility that donors might support a 
candidate as a quid pro quo for special favors after the candidate 
assumes office.266 Public records not only expose these types of 
arrangements, they discourage them as well.267 But even in the 
absence of such arrangements, disclosure maintains the public’s 
confidence in the political process and the elected officials it 
produces.268 
Here, income tax returns serve a similar purpose. Suspect 
agreements between candidates and those that seek to influence them 
may involve more than just campaign donations. They may include 
employment, gifts, loans, or other benefits. The Fifth Circuit in Plante 
considered the argument that “few [candidates] are likely to make a 
public disclosure of illegal income,” but concluded that it was enough 
for “the existence of the reporting requirement [to] discourage 
corruption.”269 Candidates are less apt to accept questionable gifts if 
they need to take additional steps to hide them. And now that the 
FECA has closed the door to large anonymous campaign 
contributions,270 the government has a greater interest in deterring 
those who may wish to circumvent the FECA’s reporting requirements 
by giving to candidates directly instead of contributing to their 
campaigns. 
Moreover, quid pro quo arrangements often allow candidates to 
profit indirectly through their family members. Because income tax 
returns include information not just of the candidates themselves, but 
also of their spouses and dependents, the disclosure of such returns has 
the potential to expose flavors of corruption not easily discovered by 
an examination of campaign ledgers. For example, in 2004, Darleen 
Druyun pled guilty to improperly favoring Boeing in procurement 
 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. (“[E]xposure may discourage those who would use money for improper purposes either 
before or after the election.”); see also Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1135 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(“[T]he existence of the reporting requirement will discourage corruption.”). 
 268. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (“Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro 
quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness 
of the opportunities for abuse . . . .”); see also Plante, 575 F.2d at 1134–35 (discussing the 
government’s interest in the “creation of public confidence in Florida’s officials”). 
 269. Plante, 575 F.2d at 1135. 
 270. See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(c)(2) (2018) (requiring the disclosure of the names, addresses, and 
occupations of donors who contribute more than $200 to a campaign). 
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decisions while serving as the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of the 
Air Force for Acquisition.271 Boeing had not only offered Druyun a 
lucrative job to commence shortly after she retired from the Air 
Force,272 it had also hired her daughter and her daughter’s fiancé.273 
Druyun later admitted that “Boeing’s employment of her future son-
in-law and her daughter . . . along with her own desire to be employed 
at Boeing, influenced her government decisions in matters affecting 
Boeing.”274 Although Druyun was not an elected official, even if she 
were, the campaign finance disclosures she would have to make under 
the FECA would not have uncovered this type of under-the-table 
dealmaking. On the other hand, the disclosure of her income tax 
returns would have had a greater chance of revealing her conflict of 
interest with Boeing. 
While one might argue that the Internal Revenue Service’s 
possession of income tax returns obviates the need for public 
disclosure, the Buckley Court found the additional benefits of public 
scrutiny to warrant its costs.275 As better put by Justice Brandeis: 
“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial 
diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light 
the most efficient policeman.”276 Even if the government could be 
expected to uncover all the illegal activity revealed by candidate tax 
returns, the public’s interest extends beyond the enforcement of laws. 
Not all unethical conduct is illegal, and not all evidence of illegal 
activity is sufficient for conviction. The public can do much with 
information suggestive of corruption but falling short of that which the 
government could act on. Finally, even supposing public disclosure 
uncovers no evidence of wrongdoing, it engenders “public confidence 
in [government] officials.”277 It is not enough simply to deter 
corruption. “[A]voidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is 
 
 271. See L-3 Commc’ns Integrated Sys., L.P. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 453, 457–58 (2007). 
 272. Druyun’s salary was to be $250,000 a year and include a $50,000 bonus. Id. at 457. 
 273. Id. at 454. 
 274. Id. at 458 (citation omitted). 
 275. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976) (“[D]isclosure requirements—certainly in 
most applications—appear to be the least restrictive means of curbing the evils of campaign 
ignorance and corruption that Congress found to exist.”). 
 276. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 62 (Nat’l 
Home Libr. Found. ed., 1933) (1914). 
 277. Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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also critical . . . if confidence in the system of representative 
Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’”278 
The final government interest in disclosure relates specifically to 
exposing illegal activity. Of the three, this interest bears the least 
relation to the proposed law. Perhaps that is why both Buckley and 
Plante put it last in their enumeration of legitimate government 
goals.279 While public scrutiny undoubtedly aids in the detection of 
unlawful conduct, the disclosure of tax returns to the government 
accomplishes substantially the same purposes. If this incremental aid 
to law enforcement justified disclosure to the public, little would 
prevent a state from requiring presidential candidates to publicly 
disclose all the documents they are required to submit to the 
government. Although the Buckley Court approved this interest, it did 
so with little discussion as to the necessity of public disclosure.280 The 
Plante court was more explicit in finding this interest wanting.281 
However, this Note need not resolve the issue, because the proposed 
law substantially relates to accomplishing the two other important 
government interests discussed above, i.e., voter education and the 
deterrence of corruption or its appearance. 
Ultimately, a law requiring presidential candidates to disclose 
their tax returns will likely survive any First and Fourteenth 
Amendment challenges because it satisfies the intermediate level of 
scrutiny required under the Supreme Court’s Anderson-Burdick test. 
c.  Distinguishing from other unconstitutional disclosure laws 
It remains to distinguish the proposed law from others the courts 
have struck down. The Buckley Court made it clear that a disclosure 
law need not exempt information that might lead to harassment to be 
constitutional on its face.282 However, the Court in McIntyre v. Ohio 
Elections Commission found that disclosure may become overly 
intrusive when it associates individuals with personal and potentially 
 
 278. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27 (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Civ. Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l 
Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)). 
 279. See id. at 66–68; Plante, 575 F.2d at 1134. 
 280. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68. 
 281. See Plante, 575 F.2d at 1135 (“The [last] interest . . . , aiding detection and prosecution of 
violations, seems less affected by the [Florida] Amendment than the others. While misdeeds may 
be deterred by the need to file either honest or perjurious financial statements, once they have been 
committed, the statements may well be useless.”). 
 282. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74. 
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provocative statements that are inherently likely to “precipitate 
retaliation.”283 Here, the nature of the financial information contained 
in income tax returns is closer to that of the campaign contributions in 
Buckley than the leaflets opposing a tax proposal in McIntyre. 
Although both may “give[] away something about [a candidate’s] 
political views,” income tax returns remain a far cry from “a 
personally crafted statement of a political viewpoint.”284 The contents 
of income tax returns are much less likely to “precipitate retaliation”285 
than political leaflets. Indeed, the Plante court found the possibility of 
kidnapping, solicitations, and embarrassment resulting from financial 
disclosure insufficient to warrant facial invalidation,286 likely because 
the potential for such occurrences is too remote or too inconsequential. 
Nevertheless, because courts have expressed a greater willingness 
to accept disclosure laws that provide some sort of safeguard against 
harassment,287 California can head off potential challenges by 
providing a procedural mechanism for candidates to redact 
particularly sensitive information. SB 27 included a provision 
requiring submitted tax returns to omit social security numbers, home 
addresses, telephone numbers, and medical information.288 It also 
permitted the redaction of the names of dependent minors, employer 
identification numbers, business addresses, and similar information 
regarding paid tax return preparers.289 Any law requiring the 
production of tax returns would do well to adopt similar provisions.290 
 
 283. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995). 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. See Plante, 575 F.2d at 1135. 
 287. See supra Part III.B.2.b. 
 288. See S.B. 27, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
 289. Id. 
 290. While public disclosure of the financial information contained in income tax returns 
generally serves the government interests articulated in Part III.B.3.b, the same cannot be said of 
the non-financial personal information contained on the same returns. Perhaps the only government 
interest served by not allowing candidates to redact their addresses, telephone numbers, and other 
identifying information is the avoidance of the minor inconvenience of having to verify or 
otherwise accommodate such redactions. It is unlikely that courts would find this administrative 
interest important enough to support a disclosure statute that does not allow candidates to omit 
purely personal information. On the other hand, some financial information may be considered 
sensitive, and may serve only some of the government interests delineated in Part III.B.3.b. For 
example, a candidate may consider her charitable donations to be personal in nature, and their 
disclosure is unlikely to expose or deter corruption or violations of law. Nevertheless, because the 
disclosure of charitable donations promotes the important government interest of voter education, 
a tax return disclosure law likely does not have to provide for the redaction of such donations to 
survive constitutional scrutiny. 
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Alternatively, a financial disclosure law could adopt Florida’s 
approach and allow candidates to submit “[a] sworn statement which 
identifies each separate source and amount of income which exceeds 
$1,000” in lieu of their tax returns.291 
The other major reservation courts have expressed about financial 
disclosure laws concerns their scope. However, unlike Buckley v. 
American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., this is not a case 
requiring disclosure from election workers when the real concern is 
with the motives of those hiring them.292 The proposed law requires 
disclosure from the candidates themselves, the individuals whose 
motives and interests it is primarily concerned with. Nor is this a case 
requiring disclosure from low-ranking government officials or their 
spouses and children.293 The proposed law requires disclosure only 
from candidates for the highest-ranking office in the country. 
Moreover, unlike the anonymous leafleteer in McIntyre or the spouses 
and children of government officials, presidential candidates, more 
than anyone else, have voluntarily thrust themselves into the political 
arena.294 In fact, although the Supreme Court in McIntyre struck down 
an Ohio statute requiring source attribution on campaign literature 
because it “applie[d] not only to the activities of candidates and their 
organized supporters, but also to individuals acting independently and 
using only their own modest resources,”295 it has since upheld the 
“Stand by Your Ad” provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act requiring candidates to appear in television advertisements they 
have authorized or paid for and state that they have approved the 
 
 291. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8. 
 292. See Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999) (striking down a law 
requiring the disclosure of the names, addresses, and salaries of paid petition circulators when the 
primary interest of the state was in identifying those who hired the petition circulators, not the 
petition circulators themselves); see also supra Part III.B.1.b. 
 293. See, e.g., City of Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 466 P.2d 225, 232–33 (Cal. 1970) 
(invalidating a California disclosure statute in part because it applied to even the lowest of 
government officials, as well as their immediate family members). But see County of Nevada v. 
MacMillen, 522 P.2d 1345, 1353 (Cal. 1974) (upholding a statute requiring the disclosure of 
property owned by a government official’s spouse or dependent children because “although an 
official may have no economic interest in such property, nevertheless he may react favorably, or 
without total objectivity, to a proposal which could materially enhance the value of that property”). 
 294. The Fifth Circuit noted that candidates for office have less of a reasonable expectation of 
privacy because they choose to subject themselves to public scrutiny. See Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 
F.2d 1119, 1135 (5th Cir. 1978). It also observed that the Court’s decision in New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) provides candidates with less protection against libel and slander 
for this very reason. Id. 
 295. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 351 (1995). 
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message contained in the advertisement.296 The Court has thus 
indicated a greater willingness to uphold disclosure statutes that apply 
only to candidates or their campaigns. 
In sum, because the compelled disclosure law proposed by this 
Note is substantially related to important government interests that the 
Court itself has recognized, and because it avoids many of the issues 
that have proven fatal to other financial disclosure laws, it is likely to 
withstand First and Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny. 
IV.  INFORMING VOTERS ABOUT TAX RETURN DISCLOSURE THROUGH 
BALLOT DESIGNATIONS 
Rather than compelling the production of tax returns with threats 
of civil or criminal sanctions, California might instead choose to 
inform voters of the fact that a candidate has failed to disclose his or 
her tax returns. Alternatively, California could provide candidates who 
have disclosed their tax returns the opportunity to directly 
communicate their disclosure to voters. These statements, made either 
by California or the candidates themselves, could be printed as a ballot 
designation or in the informational materials California sends to 
registered voters prior to elections.297 Because this method of 
incentivizing disclosure is less heavy-handed than the compelled 
disclosure laws described in Part III, it is the more likely of the two to 
pass constitutional muster. After all, statements indicating whether 
candidates have released their tax returns likely impose less of a First 
and Fourteenth Amendment burden on candidates than does a 
requirement that such tax returns be released. Under this approach, a 
candidate may decline to release his or her tax returns and still appear 
on the ballot298 without fear of civil or criminal liability.299 
 
 296. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 230–31 (2003), overruled in part on 
other grounds by Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); 52 U.S.C. 
§ 30120(d)(1)(B) (2018). 
 297. California mails voter information guides to registered voters prior to every presidential 
election. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9094 (Deering 2020). 
 298. SB 27 would have prevented such a candidate from appearing on the ballot altogether. 
S.B. 27, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (“Notwithstanding any other law, the Secretary of State 
shall not print the name of a candidate for President of the United States on a primary election 
ballot, unless the candidate, at least 98 days before the presidential primary election, files with the 
Secretary of State copies of every income tax return the candidate filed with the Internal Revenue 
Service in the five most recent taxable years . . . .”). 
 299. A compelled disclosure law would subject such a candidate to civil or criminal sanctions. 
See supra Part III. 
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Correspondingly, voters may cast ballots for a candidate irrespective 
of the candidate’s decision to disclose his or her tax returns. 
However, ballot designation laws resurrect the potential for 
invalidation under the Article II Qualifications Clause. Article II 
prohibits the addition of substantive qualifications to the presidency, 
and one of the primary objections to SB 27 was that it indirectly added 
a qualification by limiting ballot access to those who have disclosed 
their tax returns.300 Compelled disclosure laws avoid this issue by 
sanctioning candidates independently of the electoral process—a 
candidate’s refusal to release his or her tax returns does not 
disadvantage or otherwise affect his or her candidacy.301 But ballot 
designations, like ballot access restrictions, are intimately tied to 
elections. They influence voters “at the most crucial stage in the 
electoral process—the instant before the vote is cast.”302 Moreover, by 
drawing a voter’s attention to a single piece of information, they 
necessarily imply that the information is important to the voter’s 
choice.303 Like SB 27, a ballot designation does not literally disqualify 
candidates who have failed to disclose their tax returns.304 But just as 
courts may consider SB 27 an impermissible attempt to disqualify 
candidates who have not disclosed their tax returns,305 courts may take 
a similar view of a ballot designation that disfavors the same class of 
candidates by highlighting their nondisclosure. So while a ballot 
designation law may effectively address the First and Fourteenth 
Amendment challenges faced by SB 27, it remains susceptible to the 
same Qualifications Clause challenge. 
The remainder of this Note will examine both the Qualifications 
Clause and the First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to a 
hypothetical ballot designation law that informs voters about the 
availability of candidate tax returns on the ballot itself. Although this 
Note will not discuss the constitutionality of a law providing the same 
information in a voter information guide, it suffices to say that a law 
that prints information in a voter information guide is even more likely 
 
 300. See supra Part II.B.  
 301. See supra Part III.A.  
 302. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964). 
 303. See id. 
 304. Candidates who do not appear on the ballot can still run as write-in candidates in 
California. See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 8600 (Deering 2020). 
 305. See supra Part II. 
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to withstand constitutional scrutiny than one that appropriates space 
on the ballot.306 
A.  Qualifications Clause Challenge 
It is important to note at the outset that if SB 27 satisfied the 
strictures of Article II, it follows a fortiori that the proposed ballot 
designation law must as well. In both cases, the claimed substantive 
qualification is the same: Presidents must have released their tax 
returns to hold office. But a ballot designation that merely informs 
voters of a candidate’s failure to release his or her tax returns does no 
more to disqualify the candidate than SB 27’s denial of ballot access. 
This line of reasoning does not extend to the converse. A ballot 
designation law may survive a Qualifications Clause challenge even if 
SB 27 would not have. In fact, courts have indicated a willingness to 
uphold ballot designations that would likely violate Article II if the 
designations formed the basis for ballot access restrictions. For 
example, the Ninth Circuit has upheld California’s election code 
allowing candidates not only to designate their occupation, but also to 
designate themselves as the “incumbent” if the word accurately 
describes them.307 And the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld party 
membership and party preference designations.308 Nevertheless, the 
Court’s precedents make clear that the Presidential and Congressional 
Qualifications Clauses would not tolerate the removal of candidates 
from the ballot on the basis of occupation, incumbency, or party 
affiliation.309 
The disparity in the Court’s treatment of ballot access restrictions 
and ballot designations should not be surprising, as removal from the 
ballot will invariably disadvantage a candidate more than a ballot 
designation would. But the difference between the ballot designations 
 
 306. Although both the ballot and the voter information guide bear the imprimatur of the state, 
a voter information guide will likely have less of a disqualifying effect because it does not influence 
voters “the instant before the vote is cast.” Anderson, 375 U.S. at 402. 
 307. See Rubin v. City of Santa Monica, 308 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 308. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (upholding a 
Minnesota law allowing candidates to appear on the ballot as a nominee from a single political 
party); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (upholding a 
Washington law allowing candidates to designate their party preference). 
 309. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 829 (1995) (stating that the 
Qualifications Clauses do not allow states to “dress eligibility to stand for Congress in ballot access 
clothing” (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349, 357 (Ark. 1994), aff’d sub nom, 
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995))). 
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the Court has upheld and those the Court has struck down cannot be 
explained solely by a lesser disqualifying impact. Despite being 
widely accepted, the aforementioned ballot designations have large 
and obvious discriminatory effects—the incumbency advantage has 
been widely documented,310 and many citizens vote strictly on party 
lines.311 Rather, the hallmark of unconstitutional ballot designations is 
not merely their discriminatory effect, but their discriminatory 
purpose. The following cases highlight the Court’s focus on 
discriminatory purpose as a central reason for invalidating ballot-
related legislation. 
1.  Discriminatory Purpose and Discriminatory Effect 
In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the Supreme Court struck 
down an amendment to the Arkansas Constitution that excluded 
candidates who had already served three terms in the House of 
Representatives or two terms in the Senate from appearing on the 
general election ballot.312 The Court held that the Constitution neither 
sets term limits for members of Congress nor grants the States the 
authority to set such limits.313 Furthermore, the Court rejected 
Arkansas’s argument that the amendment did not actually set term 
limits because candidates who exceeded the specified number of terms 
could still run and win as write-in candidates, because “even if . . . 
incumbents may occasionally win reelection as write-in candidates, 
there is no denying that the ballot restrictions will make it significantly 
more difficult for the barred candidate to win the election.”314 The fact 
that the Arkansas amendment offered candidates who did not meet its 
qualifications an alternative path to victory did not save it. In the 
Court’s view, “an amendment with the avowed purpose and obvious 
 
 310. Analysis of election data shows in the 2018 congressional races, incumbency alone 
accounted for, on average, close to a 3 percent advantage in the popular vote. As recently as 1998, 
incumbency accounted for an 8 percent advantage. Nathaniel Rakich, How Much Was Incumbency 
Worth in 2018?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 6, 2018, 5:58 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/
how-much-was-incumbency-worth-in-2018/. 
 311. In fact, nine states allow straight-ticket voting, whereby a voter can “choose a party’s 
entire slate of candidates with just a single ballot mark.” Straight Ticket Voting States, 
NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 25, 2020), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-
and-campaigns/straight-ticket-voting.aspx. 
 312. U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 514 U.S. at 783. 
 313. Id. at 806. 
 314. Id. at 830–31. 
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effect of evading the requirements of the Qualifications Clauses by 
handicapping a class of candidates cannot stand.”315 
A few years later, Missouri attempted to accomplish substantially 
the same goals with a ballot designation law.316 An amendment to the 
Missouri Constitution required the state to print “DISREGARDED 
VOTERS’ INSTRUCTION ON TERM LIMITS” by the names of 
incumbent candidates who did not support a “Congressional Term 
Limits Amendment” to the Federal Constitution, and “DECLINED 
TO PLEDGE TO SUPPORT TERM LIMITS” by the names of 
nonincumbent candidates who did not pledge support to the same 
federal amendment.317 Although the Missouri amendment erected a 
much lower barrier to the candidacy of those who did not support term 
limits, the Court in Cook v. Gralike318 nevertheless found it violative 
of the Congressional Qualifications Clause.319 The Missouri 
amendment had the purpose of discriminating against a class of 
candidates, having been “plainly designed to favor candidates who are 
willing to support the particular form of a term limits amendment set 
forth in its text and to disfavor those who either oppose term limits 
entirely or would prefer a different proposal.”320 Furthermore, it had 
the intended effect, for “[w]hile the precise damage the labels may 
exact on candidates is disputed between the parties, the labels surely 
place their targets at a political disadvantage to unmarked candidates 
for congressional office.”321 
The Court’s reasoning in U.S. Term Limits and Cook closely 
parallels its Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection jurisprudence. 
When considering the constitutionality of laws under the Equal 
 
 315. Id. at 831 (emphasis added). 
 316. See Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 514 (2001). 
 317. See id. at 514–15. 
 318. 531 U.S. 510 (2001). 
 319. The district court held the Missouri amendment violated the Congressional Qualifications 
Clause because it had “the sole purpose of creating additional qualifications for Congress indirectly 
and [had] the likely effect of handicapping a class of candidates for Congress.” Gralike v. Cook, 
996 F. Supp. 917, 920 (W.D. Mo. 1998) (emphasis added), aff’d, 191 F.3d 191 (8th Cir. 1999), 
aff’d, 531 U.S. 510 (2001). The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding the amendment “seeks to impose 
an additional qualification for candidacy for Congress and does so in a manner which is highly 
likely to handicap term limit opponents and other labeled candidates.” Cook, 191 F.3d at 924. The 
Supreme Court ultimately agreed. Cook, 531 U.S. at 527. 
 320. Cook, 531 U.S. at 524. 
 321. Id. at 525. 
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Protection Clause,322 the Court has similarly emphasized their purpose 
and effect. In Anderson v. Martin,323 the Court invalidated the 
compulsory identification of a candidate’s race on the ballot under the 
Equal Protection Clause.324 Considered “in the light of ‘private 
attitudes and pressures’ towards Negroes at the time of its enactment,” 
the ballot designations not only had a discriminatory purpose of a 
“purely racial character,” they “could only result in [a] ‘repressive 
effect.’”325 Even outside the election context, the Court has suggested 
that heightened scrutiny should apply to laws that indirectly 
discriminate—i.e., have a discriminatory purpose and a discriminatory 
effect326—based on suspect classifications.327 The Court has thus far 
found classifications based on, inter alia, race,328 alienage,329 and 
gender,330 to be suspect. 
However, in applying the Qualifications Clauses to prohibit ballot 
designations with both a discriminatory purpose and discriminatory 
effect, the Court makes no distinction among classes of candidates. 
Instead, the Court has simply held that the Constitution never granted 
states the authority “to dictate electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor 
a class of candidates, or to evade important constitutional 
restraints.”331 Presumably, the only class of presidential candidates a 
state can purpose to discriminate against are those who are not natural 
born citizens, those who are under thirty-five years of age, or those 
who have not resided fourteen years within the United States.332 
 
 322. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 323. 375 U.S. 399 (1964). 
 324. See id. at 404. 
 325. Id. at 403 (first quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); and then 
quoting Goss v. Bd. of Educ. of Knoxville, 373 U. S. 683, 688 (1963)). 
 326. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) 
(“Proof of . . . discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“Disproportionate impact is 
not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of . . . discrimination forbidden by the 
Constitution.”). 
 327. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 
138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
 328. See id. 
 329. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971). 
 330. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 
515, 531 (1996). 
 331. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833–34 (1995). 
 332. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. This is not to say states cannot enact reasonable ballot 
access laws. The purpose of such laws is generally to prevent “voter confusion, ballot 
overcrowding, or the presence of frivolous candidacies,” not to discriminate against those 
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2.  Ballot Designations as a Form of Voter Education 
Assuming, arguendo, that SB 27 violated Article II as an indirect 
attempt to establish a substantive qualification, a ballot designation 
indicating whether a candidate has released his or her tax returns may 
nevertheless be constitutional as a procedural mechanism with a 
nondiscriminatory purpose. That purpose would be voter education. In 
fact, California’s ballot designation regulations explicitly state that 
their primary purpose “is to ensure the accurate designation of the 
candidate upon the ballot in order that an informed electorate may 
intelligently elect one of the candidates.”333 
Whether the Supreme Court would accept this stated purpose 
likely depends in large part on the language of the designation itself. 
In Cook v. Gralike, the Court relied on the lower courts’ description 
of the ballot designations as “‘pejorative,’ ‘negative,’ ‘derogatory,’ 
‘intentionally intimidating,’ ‘particularly harmful,’ ‘politically 
damaging,’ ‘a serious sanction,’ ‘a penalty,’ and ‘official 
denunciation.’”334 Certainly, if the proposed ballot designation only 
applied to candidates who had failed to disclose their tax returns and 
consisted of the words “DECLINED TO RELEASE TAX 
RETURNS” similar to the “DECLINED TO PLEDGE TO SUPPORT 
TERM LIMITS” label in Cook,335 one might infer a discriminatory 
purpose. However, more impartial methods exist to convey the same 
information. For example, California could simply print either “Tax 
Returns Available” or “Tax Returns Unavailable” under the name of 
every candidate. This has the advantage of placing a neutral label 
under every candidate’s name, instead of singling out only some for 
designation. 
However, a “Tax Returns Available” or “Tax Returns 
Unavailable” designation provides voters with little useful 
information about a candidate, indicating only a willingness on the 
part of the candidate to be transparent with his or her finances. This 
undermines the State’s claim that voter education motivates the 
 
candidates who are unable to obtain a minimum number of signatures, for example. See Munro v. 
Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986). 
 333. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 20710(a) (2020). 
 334. Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 524 (2001) (first quoting Cook v. Gralike, 191 F.3d 911, 
918, 919, 922, 925 (8th Cir. 1999), aff’d, 531 U.S. 510 (2001); and then quoting Cook v. Gralike, 
996 F. Supp. 901, 908, 910, 916 (W.D. Mo. 1998), aff’d, 191 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 1999), aff’d, 531 
U.S. 510 (2001)). 
 335. See id. 
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designation. Although unorthodox, California could strengthen its 
case by instead printing “Tax Returns Available at:” followed by a link 
to the tax returns or a summary of the tax returns on a state-hosted 
website whenever they are available.336 For candidates who have not 
disclosed their tax returns, California could refrain from printing 
anything at all. This both reduces the appearance of a discriminatory 
purpose and reduces the discriminatory effect of such a ballot 
designation scheme. The absence of a label is far less likely to 
disadvantage a candidate than a label calling attention to the 
candidate’s failure to act in accordance with the State’s wishes. And 
when present, the label provides voters with more information, thus 
better serving the government’s stated goal of voter education. 
B.  First and Fourteenth Amendment Challenges 
Even if the proposed ballot designation law overcomes the 
Qualifications Clause challenges discussed above, it must still contend 
with First and Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny. However, because 
ballot designations burden candidates’ rights to a far lesser extent than 
the denial of ballot access, the proposed law will likely survive claims 
that it violates either the First or Fourteenth Amendment. 
Most First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to ballot 
designation laws center around claims that they unconstitutionally 
burden a candidate or political party’s right to speech or association. 
For example, in Rubin v. City of Santa Monica,337 a candidate argued 
that a set of election regulations allowing him to specify his occupation 
on the ballot, but preventing him from designating himself as a “peace 
activist,” violated his First Amendment right to speech.338 The Ninth 
Circuit upheld this restriction on speech for being viewpoint neutral.339 
And in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican 
Party,340 multiple political parties contended that a statute allowing 
candidates to designate their party preference on the ballot violated its 
 
 336. The designation “Tax Returns Available at:” would be much more inconspicuous in a voter 
information guide. For presidential elections, the voter information guides contain “a notice that 
refers voters to the Secretary of State’s internet website for information about candidates for the 
offices of President and Vice President of the United States.” See CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9084(k) 
(Deering 2020). 
 337. 308 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 338. Id. at 1012–13. 
 339. Id. at 1015. 
 340. 552 U.S. 442 (2008). 
(12) 54.1_TANG.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/21  2:18 PM 
364 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:317 
First Amendment associational rights by forcing them to associate 
with candidates they might not have endorsed.341 The Supreme Court 
upheld the statute because it could be implemented in such a way so 
as to make clear that a party preference designation did not amount to 
a party endorsement.342 
The proposed law does not implicate any of the concerns thus 
described. A ballot designation consisting of the words “Tax Returns 
Available,” “Tax Returns Unavailable,” or “Tax Returns Available 
at:” does not constitute candidate speech. Because the words are 
chosen by the state, they are better characterized as state speech. 
Although this raises separate constitutional issues—for example, they 
may constitute an indirect attempt by the state to establish candidate 
qualifications in violation of Article II343—they do not raise any First 
Amendment right to speech issues. The Court has never required states 
to allow candidates a forum for speech on the ballot.344 Rather, the 
Court has only required that when a state does provide such a forum, 
it does not restrict speech in unreasonable ways.345 Nor does the state’s 
speech imply associations that do not exist. The availability and 
location of candidate tax returns are neutral statements that do not 
imply candidate association with a political party or any other 
organization. 
Finally, although a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
claim could be raised, it is unlikely to be successful. An Equal 
Protection challenge would compel a standard of review no higher 
than rational basis review for the simple reason that candidates who 
refuse to disclose their tax returns do not constitute a suspect class.346 
But even if the Court were to apply the Equal Protection Clause to this 
context, its analysis would not differ significantly from the 
Qualifications Clause analysis detailed in Part IV.A.  
 
 341. Id. at 448. 
 342. Id. at 456. 
 343. See supra Part IV.A.  
 344. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 363 (1997) (“Ballots serve 
primarily to elect candidates, not as forums for political expression.”). 
 345. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (holding that once the government 
creates a forum for speech, it “assume[s] an obligation to justify its discriminations and exclusions 
under applicable constitutional norms”). 
 346. See Rubin v. City of Santa Monica, 308 F.3d 1008, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002) (dispensing with 
an Equal Protection challenge to a statute allowing candidates to designate their incumbency status 
or occupation on the ballot, because “[n]either ‘non-incumbents’ nor ‘peace activists’ is a suspect 
class”). 
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In sum, because the proposed ballot designation law is rationally 
related to the accomplishment of a legitimate government interest—
that of voter education—it will likely survive First and Fourteenth 
Amendment scrutiny. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
A California law hoping to incentivize the release of candidate 
tax returns must comply with article II, section 5(c) of the California 
Constitution, which prohibits the exclusion from the primary ballot 
those recognized nationally or state-wide as running “for the office of 
President of the United States.”347 Additionally, to comply with the 
Federal Constitution, such a law must prove first, that it does not add 
substantive qualifications to the presidency in contravention of the 
Article II Qualifications Clause,348 and second, that it does not violate 
the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of candidates or voters.349 
Although California’s first attempt at drafting such a law was 
struck down for precluding even nationally recognized candidates 
from appearing on the presidential primary ballot if they failed to 
produce their tax returns,350 California has non-ballot-access means at 
its disposal to motivate disclosure. First, California can civilly or 
criminally sanction the nondisclosure of tax returns instead of 
conditioning ballot access on their production. This approach would 
largely avoid Qualifications Clause issues,351 while the penalties it 
imposes are unlikely to overly burden any First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights.352 Alternatively, California can allow ballot 
designations that direct voters to the tax returns of the candidates who 
have released them. Although this approach will likely be less 
effective at compelling the disclosure, it implicates fewer First and 






 347. See supra Part II.A. 
 348. See supra Part II.B. 
 349. See supra Part II.C. 
 350. See Patterson v. Padilla, 451 P.3d 1171, 1191 (Cal. 2019). 
 351. See supra Part III.A. 
 352. See supra Part III.B. 
 353. See supra Part IV.B. 
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